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SECURITY INTERESTS IN MOTOR VEHICLES UNDER
THE UCC: A NEW CHASSIS FOR CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE LEGISLATION
SomE states adopting the Uniform Commercial Code I must integrate the
Code's filing system for perfecting security interests in personalty with motor
vehicle certificate of title acts currently in force. Adoption of the Code also
raises problems pertaining to the recognition of security interests in motor
vehicles by the courts of another state. The filing system embodied in Article
Nine attempts to rationalize the interstate enforcement of security interests
generally, but application of these provisions to motor vehicle security interests
may prove particularly difficult because of the current diversity among state
rules regarding the recognition of such interests. In addition to state rules,
federal legislation also affects security interests in some motor vehicles, and
this legislation too must be worked into the Code filing scheme. The impor-
tance of the motor vehicle as a form of chattel security 2 prompts an effort
to explore some of the problems raised in this area by Article Nine of the
Code.
Motor vehicle certificates of title were orginally developed to impede the
sale of stolen motor vehicles.3 Certificate of title statutes usually provide
for the issuance of certificates containing a detailed description of the vehicle
and the identification of its owner, and further provide that title to a motor
vehicle cannot validly be transferred unless the transfer is accompanied by
assignment of the certificate.4 But certificate of title legislation also contains
provisions relating to the creation of security interests in the vehicle. These
provisions usually state that security interests in the vehicle can be perfected
by notation on the certificate itself.5 This recording system was created in
1. As of April 1, 1961, seven states had adopted the Uniform Commercial Code:
Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and
Rhode Island. See 1 & 2 CCH CoNDIT. SALE-CHAT. MORT. REP. (1960). The state legis-
latures of a number of states were to consider adoption of the Code in their 1961 ses-
sions. See Schnader, Report on the Status of the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 BANK-
ING L.J. 21 (1961).
2. See Kripke, The Modernization of Commercial Security Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 183, 187 (1951).
3. See, e.g., Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Employees Union Local 1099, 110 Ohio
App. 431, 439, 165 N.E.2d 435, 441 (1960) (dictum) ; Sims v. Sugg, 165 Kan. 489, 492, 196
P.2d 191, 194 (1948) (dictum) ; Taylor v. Burdick, 320 Mich. 25, 31, 30 N.W.2d 418, 421
(1948) (dictum).
4. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-16, -80, -87 (1958).
The contents of each certificate of title in use in 1958 is shown in picture form in
RECORDING & STATisTIcAL CORP., AUTOMOBILE TITLES AND TRANsFERs (1958).
5. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4505.04 (Page 1954); IowA CODE ANN. §
321.45(2) (Supp. 1960) ; IDAHo CODE ANN. § 49-412 (1957).
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response to the inadequacy of ordinary chattel security recordation systems
when applied to motor vehicle security interests.6 Under strict chattel mort-
gage or conditional sales laws, the sectlred party is required to record his
interest in the filing office of the city, township, or county in which the vehi-
cle was located when the security interest attached, or in the local jurisdic-
tion where the debtor then resided.1 In some states, a security interest filed
in compliance with these requirements is valid against all subsequent pur-
chasers anywhere within the state.8 Under these statutes, a purchaser is
charged with the onerous duty of checking all possible places where a secur-
ity interest in such a highly mobile chattel as a motor vehicle might have
been recorded. Some states, on the other hand, give the purchaser partial
protection by providing that a chattel security interest remains valid only for
a limited time when the chattel is moved to another filing unit within the
state. 9 But these statutes only shift the burden to the secured party, who
must follow the motor vehicle from county to county on pain of having his
interest defeated by purchasers outside the county of original filing. The cer-
tificate of title notation system attempts to alleviate this problem, at least
within the state, by creating a portable recording system which travels with
the vehicle.
Forty jurisdictions have adopted certificate of title legislation.10 The re-
maining eleven states (nontitle act states) rely on filing systems set up un-
der chattel mortgage acts, conditional sales acts, or the Uniform Commercial
Code.'1
Among the title act states, a majority have "complete" title acts.'
2 Most
of these "complete" acts provide that perfection of security interests in a
6. See Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA.
L. REv. 455 (1948).
7. See GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 157 (conditional sales), § 158 (chattel mort-
gages) (3d ed. 1949) ; 2 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws § 272.2 (conditional sales), § 265.1
(chattel mortgages) (1935) ; e.g., In re Stamford Auto Supply Co., 25 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.
Tex. 1938) ; Beaver Creek Consol. Coal Co. v. Porter Mining Co., 60 F.2d 602 (E.D. Ky.
1929).
8. IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-518 (1935); see Studebaker Bros. Co. v. Mau, 13 Wyo. 358,
80 Pac. 151, rehearing denied, 14 Wyo. 68, 82 Pac. 2 (1905).
9. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 58 (1954) ; ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 47, § 131
(1958).
10. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See Comment,
47 CALIF. L. REv. 543, 576-86 Appendix (1959). Since the California Law Re-vicw com-
pleted its compilation, Connecticut has enacted a title act. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-
165-14-195 (1960).
11. Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont. See Comment, supra note 10, at 574-75.
12. See Comment, supra note 10, at 546.
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motor vehicle can be achieved only by notation of the security interest on
the certificate of title. Many exclude new car inventory, for which certificates
are not usually granted until the vehicle is sold.13 Some, notably the Uniform
Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act, 14 exempt used car in-
ventory as well. For those vehicles to which the "complete" title act does
apply, local filing or recording statutes governing security interests in general
personalty are inapplicable. 15 A few complete title acts, however, contain no
express provision making notation the exclusive method of recordation, and
these might be construed to permit perfection of security interests in motor
vehicles by other means. 6 Under both kinds of "complete" title act, either
the owner or the holder of the security interest ordinarily forwards the cer-
tificate covering the vehicle, together with an application stating the nature
of the security interest being created, to a state noting agency which issues
a new certificate revealing the security interest.'7 If there is no certificate
covering the vehicle, as in the case of new vehicles held for sale, a certificate
showing the interest is issued when the chattel is sold.' s Depending upon
the statute, the certificate may be delivered by the noting agency to the senior
secured party, or to the party in possession of the vehicle.19
Under "incomplete" title acts, notation on the certificate of title is not re-
quired to perfect all security interests in a vehicle. These acts usually permit
notation of security interests only when the vehicle is transferred. 20 Unless
there is a change in ownership when the interest is created, therefore, a party
wishing to perfect his interest must rely on local recording statutes.2 ' A sub-
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.21 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 201(b)
(1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-117 (1958).
14. Such statutes generally provide that no certificate of title need be obtained for
a vehicle held by a dealer for sale. See ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 95 / § 3-102(2) (Smith
Hurd 1958); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-166 (1960).
15. ALrssx Coup. LAws ANN. § 50-6-10(6) (Supp. 1958); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-6-19 (1954); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-414 (1948). Such title acts usually supersede
only the filing provisions of the earlier legislation. Provisions relating to the validity of
the underlying security agreement generally remain applicable. Ibid. See 9B UNIFORm LAWS
ANN. § 25 & Commissioners' Note. See, e.g., In re Ramsdell, Bkcy. No. 29448 (D. Conn.
1060) ; In re Reese, 33 Berks 93 (Pa. 1960).
16. E.g., Kansas, Oregon, and Washington. See Comment, .supra note 10, at 578-86.
Missouri and New Jersey require local filing as well as notation. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 443.480 (1952); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:10-11(c) (1961).
17. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-22 (1954); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
14-186 (1960) ; ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1310B (1956).
18. New vehicle inventory is covered by manufacturer's or importer's certificates
which must be transferred to the buyer on sale. This document is then forwarded with the
application for a certificate of title. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4505.05 (Page 1954);
S.D. CODE § 44.0202 (Supp. 1952) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2503 (1952).
19. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.24(2) (Supp. 1960), with S.C. CODE § 46-139.47,
139(22) (Supp. 1960).
20. See, e.g., W.VA. CODE ANN. § 1721(122) (Supp. 1960) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2501
(Supp. 1960) (No provision for noting subsequent liens except at transfer time).
21. See, Automobile Acceptance Corp. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 216 Md. 344,
1961]
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sequent secured party, seeking to determine the existence of a prior encum-
brance, is in no better position as to security interests acquired between
transfers of ownership than he would be in a state with no certificate of title
act at all. The "incomplete" title acts typically require the owner of a motor
vehicle to make known all existing liens upon application for a new certifi-
cate, imposing criminal penalties for failure to comply.22 It has been held,
however, that the secured party who records his interest in another manner
remains protected whether or not the owner of the vehicle complies with this
duty.23
In states without certificate of title legislation, annual registration protects
against theft and provides a convenient means for levying taxes on motor
vehicles.24 Owners of motor vehicles must usually notify a central de-
partment of any transfer and must also assign the certificate of registration
to the transferee.2 5 But holders of security interests in motor vehicles must
seek protection under a local recording system.
26
The problem of where to record a security interest in a motor vehicle is
dramatized once the chattel is driven to another jurisdiction and sold. While
the hornbook rule is that the validity of a security interest in a chattel is
governed by the law of the situs of the chattel when the interest is created, 7
subsequent purchasers or lien creditors often prevail over security interests
perfected "out-of-state. '28 Courts of the second state often reach this result
by holding that the secured party has committed some form of negligence,
such as lack of diligence in pursuing the vehicle, clothing the debtor with
indicia of title, or negligence in extending credit to the defrauding debtor..20
A few states have provided a grace period during which a security interest in
an incoming vehicle remains perfected; in these states the secured party is there-
by afforded an opportunity to overtake the vehicle and re-perfect his interest. 30
352, 139 A.2d 683, 687 (1957) (application of recording statute to motor vehicle encum-
brances assumed without discussion).
22. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2501, -2506 (1952) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 V2, §§ 24(a)
(3), 46 (1957) ; N.D. REv. CODE §§ 39-05-05(3), 39-05-33 (1960).
23. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Schneider, 265 Wis. 264, 61 N.W.2d 499 (1953).
24. See Townsend, The Case of the Mysterious Accessory, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
197, 199 (1951).
25. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51 § 706 (1940) ; N.H. Rgv. STAT. ANN. § 260 :19 (1955).
26. But cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 68-207 (1933) (note liens on application for registration
certificate.)
27. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 157-58 (3d ed. 1949) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAws §§ 265.1, 272.2 (1935).
28. Four cases, decided in 1947, protected local parties against out-of-state security
interests. Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA. L. REv.
455, 461-68 (1948) (analyzing cases).
29. See Comment, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 543, 556-68 (1959).
30. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-185 (1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95Y2, § 3-202
(Smith-Hurd 1958) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-160(c) (Supp. 1959). All of these sections
were borrowed from the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act,
9B UNIFORm LAws ANN. § 20 (1955).
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But the position of a secured party who has not perfected his interest in the
new jurisdiction remains precarious.
PROBLEAIS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In jurisdictions which adopt the Uniform Commercial Code, the Secured
Transactions Article must be reconciled with the pre-existing law governing
security interests in motor vehicles. When the Code is passed by nontitle act
states this adjustment is simple: the Code's filing system is used to perfect
security interests in all chattels, including motor vehicles. In so far as title
act jurisdictions are concerned, the Code's drafters foresaw the apparent
inconsistency between Article Nine's filing system for all forms of personalty
and the certificate of title method of perfecting security interests through
notation.-" Section 9-302(3) (b) of the Code offers two different methods
for incorporating title acts into Article Nine. Under Alternative A, title
acts remain the exclusive means of perfecting interests in motor vehicles even
after adoption of the Code. This provision should be chosen only in states
with "complete" title acts which provide that notation is the exclusive meth-
od of perfecting security interests.3 2 Alternative B, on the other hand, is
available for a title act state in which notation is simply a permissible method
of perfecting security interests. Alternative B applies if "notation of .. . a
security interest can be indicated ... on a certificate."3 3 Section 9-302(4),
however, deftly converts any title act which merely permits notation into a
mandatory-notation title act:
A security interest in property covered by a statute described in sub-
section (3) can be perfected only by . .. indication of the security in-
terest on a certificate of title or a duplicate thereof by a public official.3 4
In those states where a security interest cannot be perfected by notation
unless the ownership of the vehicle is transferred,35 any interest which at-
taches between transfers of the vehicle would not seem to be an interest which
"can be indicated" on the certificate of title within the meaning of Alterna-
tive B. If this interpretation is correct, such an interest can be perfected
only through Article Nine filing. Presumably an interest created between
tranfers of ownership would be noted on the certificate of title issued when
the vehicle is next transferred. On the other hand, "can be indicated" might
be interpreted to mean "can ever be indicated." Under this interpretation of
31. The May 1949 Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code contained a complete title
act incorporated into the Code. UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-801 (May 1949 Draft).
32. Apparently, if the Code was enacted in Missouri which requires both notation and
filing to perfect a security interest in a motor vehicle, the filing requirement would no longer
apply. Local filing systems would be displaced by the Article Nine filing system. See note
16 supra.
33. UCC § 9-302(3) (b) alt. B. (Emphasis added.)
34. Emphasis added.
35. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
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Alternative B, the adoption of Alternative B would have the effect of making
Article Nine filing provisions inapplicable to security interests created be-
tween transfers of ownership, since such interests can be perfected by nota-
tion whenever the vehicle is transferred. In that case, security interests
created between transfers would be governed by the existing title act. But
this reading of Alternative B creates problems. The incomplete title acts
make no provisions for notation before such time as title to the vehicle is
transferred.36 Section 9-302(4), on the other hand, provides that notation
on the certificate becomes the exclusive method of perfecting those security
interests which are exempted from Article Nine filing by Alternative B.
Thus, joining "incomplete" title acts with section 9-302(4) leads to an
anomalous result; the secured party has no way to perfect his interest until
title to the vehicle is transferred. The only way to avoid this problem would
be to construe section 9-302(4) as authorizing the state notation agency to
make notations on the certificate at any time. It is doubtful, however, that a
general statement of law can by itself constitute a directive to administra-
tive officers, governed by a specific statute, to expand their functions by
taking on these additional duties.
Inventory Vehicles
Although Alternative B, as modified by section 9-302(4), is to a signifi-
cant degree identical with Alternative A, there may be a critical difference
between the two alternatives in the particular case of used vehicles held
for sale by a dealer. While certificates of title are not usually issued for
new inventory vehicles, used vehicles are covered by such certificates, as-
signed to the dealer by former owners 7 In some states, security interests
in used vehicle inventory are governed by the title act and must be re-
corded on the certificates.3s If Alternative A is adopted in such states,
the title act will continue to apply to security interests in such vehicles. 39
The differently worded provisions of Alternative B, on the other hand,
36. Ibid.
37. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 321.45(2) (Supp. 1960) ; MONT. REV. CODES § 53-109
(c) (1954) ; TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1436-1, § 33 (1953).
38. In the absence of a specific exclusion for inventory vehicles, the inclusion of such
interests arises from the general provisions requiring certificates of titles for all vehicles.
For cases requiring notation on the certificate of security interests in inventory vehicles see
Metropolitan Fin. Corp. v. Morf, 42 Cal. App. 2d 756, 109 P.2d 969 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941) ;
Buss v. McKee, 115 Colo. 159, 170 P.2d 268 (1946) ; Sorenson v. Pagenkopf, 151 Kan. 913,
101 P2d 928 (1940) ; Rasmussen v. 0. E. Lee & Co., 104 Mont. 278, 66 P.2d 119 (1937).
See generally Townsend, supra note 24, at 2247.7.
39. Alternative A exempts from Article 9 filing all security interests for which a state
statute "requires" notation on the certificate of title. It makes no distinction between in-
ventory and noninventory vehicles. Where security interests in used vehicles are covered
by certificates of title, and must be noted, therefore, they would remain included within the
title act.
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suggest that Article Nine's filing system becomes the sole means of
perfecting security interests in all inventory vehicles, new or used.40 Thus
the applicable law governing security interests in used inventory vehicles
will differ depending upon whether Alternative A or B is enacted.
This difference may give rise to two different sets of relationships between
parties holding security interests in the dealer's inventory and subsequent
buyers of the used vehicles. Under the Code, a buyer in the ordinary course
of business takes "free of a security interest created by his seller even though
it is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence."' Section
1-201(9) defines "a buyer in ordinary course of business" as one who takes
from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind "without knowl-
edge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security
interest of a third party in the goods . . . ." The Code defines "knowledge"
as actual knowledge,42 so that the buyer would appear to "know" the sale
40. UCC § 9-302(3) (b) alt. B:
(3) The filing provisions of this Article do not apply to a security interest in...
Alternative B
(b) ... a motor vehicle which is not inventory held for sale for which a certificate
of title is required under the statutes of this state ....
It is possible to read this section as excluding from Article Nine filing only security interests
in "a motor vehicle which is not [inventory held for sale for which a certificate of title is
required] . . . ." The bracketed phrase refers only to used vehicle inventory, and so in-
terpreted would mean that only used vehicle inventory would be exempt from Article Nine
filing. Such a reading would remove all non-inventory vehicles from the coverage of the title
act and make Article Nine filing the sole method of perfecting security interests in those
vehicles. This is an undesirable result. UCC 9-302 Comment 8. The better reading would ex-
clude from Article Nine filing only security interests in "a motor vehicle [,J which is not
inventory held for sale [,] for which a certificate of title is required under the statutes of this
state."
Alternative B would thus appear to alter the pre-Code law of some title act states with
regard to purchases of used vehicles from inventory. These provisions of the Code do not
specifically state that they amend existing title acts. As a result, one might invoke the
rule that general statutes (i.e. the Code) should not be construed as an implied repeal
of prior statutes covering particular phases of the same subject. See 1 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2021 (3d ed. 1943) [hereinafter cited as SUTMERLAND]. But
alternative construction of Alternative B to conform with prior law seems impossible.
Moreover, the next subsection, § 9-302(4), demonstrates another specific conflict with
permissive "complete" title acts, a clear implied amendment of prior law. The general rule
of construction in cases of conflict between existing statutes is that "the prior law yields to
the extent of the conflict." 1 SUTHERLAND § 2012; ef. Weisel v. McBride, 191 Pa. Super.
411, 156 A.2d 613 (1959) (court interpreting Code refused to subordinate a buyer in the
ordinary course of business to security interest noted on a certificate of title after buyer
had paid purchase price).
41. UCC § 9-307(1). The phrase "created by his seller" indicates that the buyer in
the ordinary course of business may not take free of an interest created by someone other
than "his seller." Thus, when A borrows from B on the security of A's car, A later selling
the vehicle to a dealer, B's properly perfected interest may prevail over a buyer in the
ordinary course of business from the dealer.
42. UCC § 1-201(25).
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violates rights of a third party only if he knows that there is a security agree-
ment, and that the agreement prohibits sale by the dealer. Even then, if the
buyer knows that the secured party has entrusted the goods to a dealer, it
might not be unreasonable for the buyer to assume that the secured party has
waived any prohibition on sale. Support for such a view might be found by
analogy to Article Two, which expressly provides that "any entrusting of
possession of goods to a [dealer] gives him power to transfer all rights of
the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." 43 The Code's posi-
tion has been followed in a number of nontitle act jurisdictions and jurisdic-
tions in which notation is not the exclusive method of perfection. Buyers in the
ordinary course of. business have been allowed to prevail over security interests
perfected through chattel mortgage or conditional sales filing systems. If it is
not expressly permitted by statute,44 this result is reached on the theory that
a mortgagee who permits a dealer to display a mortgaged vehicle for sale
impliedly consents to the sale free of the encumbrance. 45 Even in mandatory
notation states, a number of title acts expressly protect buyers in the ordin-
ary course of business.
46
When, however, the statute provides that notation will give notice to
"purchasers" and this is coupled with a requirement that a certificate be
transferred to prevent the sale from being void,47 the problem of protecting
buyers in the ordinary course of business becomes more difficult for courts.
Such buyers have often prevailed when they have been deceived by a fraud-
ulently obtained "clean" certificate.48 The Virginia court has gone further,
allowing a buyer in the ordinary course of business to prevail over a secured
party whose interest was properly noted and who was in possession of the
certificate.4 9 This decision seems to have been reached on the theory that
the secured party had waived the express provisions of the statute relating
to "notice to purchasers" by permitting the vehicle to be offered by a dealer
for sale.50 Despite examples of bending title acts in this fashion, it seems
reasonable to conclude that express statutory provisions charging buyers
with constructive notice will impede recognition of the traditional policy of
protecting buyers in the ordinary course of business. Sound commercial
43. UCC § 2-403(2).
44. For an explicit statutory provision, see, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 230-c(6) (Mc-
Kinney, Supp. 1960).
-45. See Fogle v. General Credit Inc., 122 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1941); cf. Buss v. Mc-
Kee,-115 Colo. 159, 170 P.2d 268 (1946).
46. E-g., I"L. ANN. STAT. tit. 95 /2, § 3-201(c) (Smith-Hurd 1958); CONN. GEN.
STT. ANN. § 14-6 
(1960).
47. E.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4505.04, 4505.13 (Page 1954); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-1-72 (1960); MONT. REV. CODE § 53-109(d) (1954).
48. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Pagenkopf, 151 Kan. 913, 101 P.2d 928 (1940) ; Rasmussen
v. 0. E. Lee & Co., 104 Mont. 278, 66 P.2d 119 (1937).
49. General Credit Inc. v. Winchester, Inc., 196 Va. 711, 85 S.E.2d 201 (1955).
50. Ibid.; see Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 754, 761 (1959).
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policy dictates that Alternative B be enacted by all Code states whose title
acts govern used car inventory and do not specifically protect buyers in the
ordinary course of business. 51 Buyers who know that they will be subordin-
ated to noted security interests may be discouraged from purchasing used
motor vehicles. And it is to the advantage of both the dealer and his financ-
ing agency to stimulate consumer purchases of inventory; the proceeds re-
ceived upon disposition of a vehicle are the major concern of the dealer and
also the source of repayment to the financer.
5 2
Unperfected Security Interests
Another conflict between the Code and certificate of title legislation con-
cerns the consequences of a failure to perfect a security interest. In some
title act jurisdictions any interest that is not recorded on the certificate will
not be recognized. The putative secured party is treated as a general un-
secured creditor, with "no right, title, claim, or interest in the vehicle.
'53
On the other hand, the Code provides that where its filing system is the
means of perfecting security interests in any chattel, failure to perfect does
not result in the loss of all rights in that chattel.5 4 Rather, the unperfected
interest is simply subordinated under section 9-301 to properly perfected in-
terests to certain lien creditors, and to insolvency representatives. This differ-
ence in the status of the unperfected security interest may have many con-
sequences. Under the title act rule, for example, a secured party who at-
tempts to realize the value of the vehicle by taking possession or by disposing
of it can be restrained by general creditors upon the theory that he has no
"right, title, claim or interest" in the vehicle.56 Under the Code, an unper-
fected secured party's rights in the vehicle extend to possession and dis-
position upon the debtor's default.5 7 State title acts containing the strict
51. Of the seven states which have enacted the Code, only Pennsylvania, Connecticut,
and Arkansas have title acts. Pennsylvania originally chose Alternative A. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A, § 9-302(2) (b) (1954). In 1959, Pennsylvania replaced Alternative A with
Alternative B. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-302(3) (b) (1960). Connecticut enacted Alter-
native .4. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-302 (1960). Arkansas enacted Alternative A.
Acts 1961, No. 185, § 902(3) (b). Although Kentucky requires notation of security in-
terests on the registration certificate covering the vehicle, Ky. 1Ev. STAT. ANN. § 186.195,
(Supp. 1961), security interests in motor vehicles are subject to Article Nine filing, Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.740.
52. On the problems of used vehicle inventory financing, see Skilton, Cars For Sale:
Some Comments on the Wholesale Financing of Automobiles, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 352,
390-408.
53. See e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4505.04 (Page 1954); IowA CODE ANN. §
321.45(2) (Supp. 1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-404 (1957).
54. E.g., UCC § 9-503 (right to possession after default); UCC § 9-504 (right to
dispose of collateral after default).
56. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4505.04 (Page 1954).
57. See note 54 supra.
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provision should be amended to conform to the general policy of the Code to-
ward unperfected security interests.
The Code provisions governing the effect of delayed perfection of a secur-
ity interest may conflict with what appears to be the rule under a few title
acts. The Code provides that, between an unperfected interest and a general
creditor without knowledge of the interest, the first to perfect or to obtain a
judicial lien will prevail.58 The requirement that the lien creditor be "without
knowledge" means that a prior judicial lien will not prevail over an unper-
fected interest if the lienor had actual knowledge of the unperfected interest at
the time he secured the lien. Here, the Code's position conflicts with a body of
chattel mortgage and conditional sales law that has grown up around the New
York rule announced in Karst v. Gane.50 In at least seven states 60 the chattel
mortgage laws provide that a mortgage not filed immediately upon execution of
the security agreement, or within a reasonable time thereafter, can be avoided by
any general creditor who had extended credit prior to the filing of the mortgage,
or, in some states, in the gap between creation and perfection of the interest.
Prior general creditors will prevail even if they obtain judicial liens after the
security interest has been perfected. This rule seems to have been incorporated
explicitly in at least one certificate of title act,"' and may be engrafted by courts
on to others.6 2 While the rule itself might not operate harshly as a penalty for late
filing of the security interest, it has a particularly disastrous effect in bank-
ruptcy. Under the rule of Moore v. Bay,63 the existence of one prior creditor
will enable the trustee to defeat the security interest entirely. The Code posi-
tion seems to have been taken to defeat this possibility, reasoning that creditors
58. UCC § 9-301(1)(b).
59. 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893).
60. Cases interpreting statutes in this manner include: Ruggles v. Cannedy, 127 Cal.
290, 53 Pac. 911 (1899); Production Credit Ass'n v. Kent, 143 Me. 145, 56 A.2d 631
(1948) ; Thomas Roberts & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37, 118 Ati. 198 (1922) ; see Fried-
man v. Sterling Refrigerator Co., 104 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1939) ; Ransom & Randolph
Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 31, 261 N.W. 128 (1935) ; Pearson v. Lafferty, 197 Mo. App. 123,
193 S.W. 40 (1917) ; Union Nat'l Bank v. Oium, 3 N.D. 193, 200-01, 54 N.W. 1034, 1036
(1892) ; Hollenbeck v. Louden, 35 S.D. 320, 152 N.W. 116 (1915) ; Brockhurst v. Cox,
71 N.J. Eq. 703, 64 At]. 182 (Ch. 1906), aff'd, 72 N.J. Eq. 950, 73 Atl. 1117 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1907).
61. The New Jersey act specifies that application for notation must be made within
five days after the execution of the security interest or there shall be the same result of
failure to record as exists under the chattel mortgage statute. N.J. STAT. AN. § 39:
10-11 (1961). Failure to record a chattel mortgage within five days makes the security
interest "absolutely void as' against the creditors of the mortgagor." Id. § 46:28-5. See
Brockhurst v. Cox, supra note 60 .(delayed recordation invalid against existing creditors,
valid as to subsequent creditors).
62. The California statute's provision that 30 days constitutes a "reasonable time" for
application for notation of a chattel mortgage covering a motor vehicle, while it seems to
attempt to relax the rule, might nevertheless be construed to incorporate it by the reference
to "reasonable time." CAL. VEH. CoDE § 6300(b).
63. 284 U.S. 4 (1931) ; see 4 CoLLiER, BANCRUPTcY 70.95 (14th ed. 1959).
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who have relied upon the general credit of the debtor instead of taking security
are in no position to complain when either perfected or unperfected interests pre-
vail over them. Although the Code does not purport to amend certificate of title
acts in this respect, adoption of the Code will have the effect of repealing
the Karst v. Gane rule in title acts wherever its application there is based on
specific or implied reference to codification of the rule in the state's chattel
mortgage act; the Code explicitly repeals the underlying chattel mortgage
acts.64 To the extent that the Karst rule currently survives as a common law
rule, it would nevertheless seen preferable to treat the Code's policy as govern-
ing.
The Date of Perfection
The Code's lien creditor test requires that the lien be obtained prior to the
perfection of a competing security interest.65 A divergency exists between
title acts in their determination of when a security interest in a motor vehicle
is perfected. Some acts date perfection from the time the application for nota-
tion is filed with the noting agency.66 Others state that constructive notice
of a security interest dates from the time it is noted on the certificate. 67 The
Code displays a similar ambivalence. For most security interests perfection
dates from the receipt of an application for perfection by the filing officer.
68
When an existing title act is made applicable to motor vehicles, on the other
hand, section 9-302(4) declares that perfection can only be achieved "by
indication on the certificate of title." While this distinction in the Code might,
on its face, seem inconsistent, it may be explained by the nature of the per-
fection systems governing motor vehicles and those controlling more common
chattels. The certificate of title system is based on actual notification to subse-
quent secured parties through the certificate itself. On the other hand, the Code
filing system is founded on constructive notice given through recordation.
The difference between these rules has practical significance only when
some mistake is made by the filing or noting officer. Modification of all
title acts to date perfection from the time applications for notation were
received might avoid the possibility that the second of two applications re-
ceived might be the first noted. However, it would not solve the problem raised
when an interest is not noted at all.69 In that case, a subsequent secured party
64. UCC § 10-102.
65. UCC § 9-301(1) (b) & comment 2.
66. E.g., D.C. CoDE AN-N. § 40-703(d) (1951); NEv. REv. STAT. § 482.440 (1960);
N.M. STAT. AmN. § 64-5-1(d) (1953). Relation back provisions in some statutes date
perfection as of the time the security agreement was executed if it was filed or noted within
a specified period. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-139.84 (Supp. 1960).
67. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. AN. § 319.27(2) (1958) ; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 443.480
(1949) ; NED. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60-110 (1952).
68. UCC § 9-403(1) & comment 1.
69. Cf. Securities Credit Corp. v. Pindell, 153 Neb. 298, 44 N.W.2d 501 (1950) (fail-
ure of clerk to note lien on certificate.)
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might take a vehicle covered by a "clean" certificate only to discover that
constructive notice of a prior unnoted interest dated from the time the ap-
plication for notation was received.
In one Code jurisdiction amendments have been proposed to section 9-302
(4) and to the title act, providing that notation shall be dated from the time
the certificate is delivered to the commissioner of motor vehicles.70 This pro-
posal conforms perfection under the title act to the rest of the Code. One
difficulty which seems to inhere in this approach is the apparent necessity
of providing for time-stamping and filing of applications at the office of the
notation agency, a practice which may not be customary in those states which
date perfection from the time of notation on the certificate.
Proceeds from the Sale of the Vehicle
Under the Code, a properly perfected security interest is protected against
sale of the vehicle in several ways. Section 9-306(2), which will govern motor
vehicle interests in nontitle act states,71 provides that a security interest "con-
tinues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor."
Proceeds is defined broadly enough to include either cash or a vehicle received
in trade--"whatever is received when collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged,
collected or otherwise disposed of." 72 The secured party's interest in proceeds
is considered perfected "if the interest in the original collateral was per-
fected." 73 However, perfection ceases ten days after receipt of the proceeds by
the debtor unless the financing statement filed by the secured party covered
proceeds as well as the original collateral, or unless the debtor perfects an
interest in the proceeds by filing an appropriate financing statement within the
ten day period.74 In insolvency proceedings, a financing statement that covers
proceeds would also perfect the holder's interest "in all cash and bank ac-
counts of the debtor" even if the cash proceeds were commingled or deposited
in a bank account.
75
70. Copy of proposed amendments on file in Yale Law Library. If the application is
filed within ten days of execution, the date of perfection relates back to the day of creation.
71. Article Nine's general filing provisions apply to motor vehicles in nontitle act
states. UCC § 9-302(3) (b).
72. UCC § 9-306(1).
73. UCC § 9-306(3).
74. UCC §§ 9-306(3)(a), -(b).
75. UCC § 9-306(4)(d). This interest in unidentifiable proceeds is "limited to an
amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds received by *the debtor within
-ten days before the institution of the insolvency proceedings." UCC § 9-306(4) (d) (ii).
The validity of the proceeds sections of the Code in a federal bankruptcy proceeding will
turn on whether or not the "continuously perfected" security interest in the unidentifiable
proceeds is construed to be a lien or a state-created priority. See 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as
-mended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1958) ; 4 COLLIER § 70.58, 3 COLLIER § 64.02. Compare In re
Harpeth Motors, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955) (construing § 9-306's prede-
cessor, UNIFO,.M TRusT RECEIPTS LAW § 10, as creating a lien) with In re Crosstown
Motors, 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 811 (1960) (construing the
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In the event of an unauthorized sale of an encumbered vehicle, the secured
party need not rely on the availability of proceeds for the sole protection of
his security interest. Under section 9-306(2) the interest in the vehicle con-
tinues, even after it has been sold or otherwise transferred, unless the sale
"was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or other-
wise ... .,,70 The sale of vehicles which are inventory held for sale is almost
always authorized. 77 As to noninventory vehicles, the Code's drafters note
that "a claim to proceeds in a filed financing statement might be considered
as impliedly authorizing sale or other disposition of the collateral, depending
upon the circumstances of the parties, the nature of the collateral, the course
of dealing of the parties, and the usage of the trade. '7 8 Such an implied
authorization might arise, for example, in the case of an automobile rental
agency which replaces its fleet at the end of the model year. Such sales would
seem to be in accord with the usage of the trade. The opposite inference might
be raised if an income producing truck were sold for cash, since the security
interest might not be adequately recompensed from the proceeds of a sale.
Close cases involving implied authorization to sell might be resolved by amend-
ing section 9-402(3) of the Code to provide that the secured party must note
on the financing statement whether or not he agrees to a sale; failure to make
an explicit statement, in conjunction with a demand for proceeds, could be
considered an implied authorization to sell.
Title act states enacting Alternative B of section 9-302(3) face other prob-
lems. Under Alternative B security interests in motor vehicles which are not
"inventory held for sale" are exempted from Code filing and can be perfected
only by notation on a certificate of title.79 Conceivably, section 9-302(3)
might be construed to make the Code's filing system inapplicable only to the
security interest in the vehicle itself, so that enactment of Alternative B would
not preclude use of Code filing to pre-perfect an interest in proceeds at the
same time that the security interest in the vehicle is perfected by notation. On
the other hand, subsection (3) might be construed more broadly, to make
Code filing inapplicable to the entire transaction. In this case, no financing
statement is available to "pre-perfect" an interest in proceeds. The secured
party's interest in proceeds would then have to be perfected "before the ex-
piration of the ten day period" following the debtor's receipt of these pro-
ceeds.8 0 If the proceeds are cash, the secured party must seize the funds with-
in ten days or lose his perfected status; under the Code possession is the only
§ 10 interest as, a priority). See also 2 B.C. IND. & Commt. L. Rzv. 73, 83-84 (1960) ;'Ken-
nedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform ,Cohninercia- Code: Some Problems
Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 518; 531-34 (1960).
76. UCC § 9-306(2). Of course, the secured party may have but one satisfaction. Id.
at comment 3.
77. See Skilton, supra note 52, at 354. See text at note 43 supra.
78. UCC § 9-306 comment 3.
79. See § 9-302(4).
80. UCC § 9-306(3)(b).
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method of perfecting an interest in cash.8' For most noncash proceeds, the
secured party can perfect his interest by filing a financing statement covering
them within ten days.
82
Under either the broad or the narrow construction of 9-302(3), perfection
of an interest in proceeds will be difficult in cases where the debtor receives
a vehicle as proceeds. The secured party would have to obtain the title cer-
tificate of the "proceeds" vehicle and present it to the noting agency with the
security agreement containing the claim to proceeds. State title acts generally
speak in terms of presenting a "chattel mortgage" to the noting agency,8 3
and since the permissible scope of such security agreements is defined by the
Code where enacted,8 4 a security agreement covering proceeds would pre-
sumably be cognizable by the noting agency. In addition, if the sale is made
to buyers not in the ordinary course of business the security interest will re-
main perfected in the original vehicle by virtue of the title act provisions
governing subsequent purchasers.8 5
The same consequences may ensue in title act states enacting Alternative
A, but the difficulty in perfecting an interest in proceeds may also extend to
proceeds from the sale of inventory vehicles. If the title act requires that secu-
rity interests in used vehicle inventory be recorded by notation on the certifi-
cate,86 that notation procedure continues in force under Alternative A. 8 7 In
other words, the Code filing system will not be available for security interests
in used vehicle inventory. As in the case of noninventory vehicles under Al-
ternative B, the secured party may not be able to pre-perfect his interest in
non-vehicle proceeds, and will be required to obtain the certificate and apply
for a notation in order to perfect an interest in trade-in vehicles. States whose
title acts apply to used vehicle inventory could avoid these difficulties in the
field of inventory financing by enacting Alternative B.
After-Acquired Property
The security agreement between the debtor and the holder of the security
interest may provide for the attachment of that interest to subsequently ac-
quired property.8 Arrangements of this kind might arise in the context of long
term financings covering a large number of vehicles owned by a single debtor.
81. See UCC § 9-306 comment 2(c), which states that those who receive funds paid
out from a comingled account in the operation of the debtor's business take free of security
interests.
82. UCC § 9-306(3) (b).
83. See, e.g., MONT. RFv. CODES ANN. § 53-110(a) (1954) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. 64-5-
l(b) (1960) ; Onio REv. CODE ANN. 4505.13 (Page 1954).
84. The Code is substituted for chattel mortgage acts and similar statutes, which are
explicitly repealed. UCC § 10-102.
85. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
87. See note 39 supra.
88. UCC §§ 9-204(1),-(3).
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Perfection of an interest in the after-acquired motor vehicles of a debtor is
relatively simple whenever, as in nontitle act states, the Code filing system
applies to motor vehicles. Under the Code, the secured party is simply required
to claim after-acquired property in the security agreement and to describe the
types of collateral secured in the financing statement.89
Since financing statements are not available to perfect security interests in
after-acquired noninventory vehicles in title act states, a secured party in those
states must police the acquisitions of his debtor and be certain that he notes his
interest on every certificate of title. This obligation may be particularly onerous
when the security interest covers a large number of vehicles. The simplicity of
the Code's single financing statement might be achieved, however, if title acts
were amended to authorize a special type of title certificate which could cover
a number of vehicles owned by one debtor. 0 For purposes of perfecting in-
terests in after-acquired property, the application for a fleet certificate could
be designated by the parties as a continuing authorization to the noting agency
to note the secured party's interest in each vehicle acquired by the debtor sub-
sequent to the execution of the security agreement. The use of fleet certificates
to cover after-acquired vehicles would require several innovations. First, the
system would operate best if there were a single statewide noting agency.
Second, the following procedure would be required to make sure that new
vehicles purchased by the debtor are noted on his fleet certificate: The noting
agency must keep a file containing copies of all such fleet certificates. All
applications for a certificate would have to be checked against the file to deter-
mine whether the transferee is subject to an outstanding fleet certificate which
contains an after-acquired property clause. This procedure would be a rela-
tively simple task in each case, since there probably will be few fleet certifi-
cates in the file of any one state. If the transferee is subject to such a fleet
certificate, the noting agency would then cancel the certificate of title current-
ly covering the purchased vehicle, and would record a description of that
vehicle on the debtor's existing fleet certificate. Conversely, when a fleet
vehicle is sold, the debtor-transferor would have to present the fleet certificate
to the noting agency. The title act might provide an added check against un-
authorized sale of fleet vehicles by granting possession of the certificate to the
89. UCC §§ 9-204(3), -402(1). Section 9-108 of the Code attempts to protect after-
acquired property agreements from a bankruptcy trustee's challenge that they are voidable
preferences. In amplification of that provision the comment to it asserts that "interests in
after-acquired property have never been considered as involving transfers of property for
antecedent debt merely because of the after-acquired feature ... . ." UCC § 9-108 comment
1. On the other hand, critics of this position assert that security interests in after-acquired
property are "really" given for an antecedent debt. Kennedy, supra note 75, at 546-49. See
generally Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property
Clauses under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 194 (1959).
90. The suggestion of a fleet certificate was made in the May 1949 Draft of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, § 7-813. The following description, however, differs materially
from the sketchy Code proposal, which seemed to contemplate certificates covering identi-
cal vehicles which would not be described separately on the document.
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obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
The agency would strike the description of the vehicle sold from the fleet
certificate and issue an ordinary single vehicle certificate to the transferee.
Under the usual practice of title act notation, the secured party's interest
would usually be noted on the new certificate issued to the transferee. This
practice could create problems for the fleet owner who makes periodic replace-
ments of his fleet by trading-in the old vehicles, since the trade-in value of
old vehicles would be reduced if they were traded subject to the secured
party's interest. This problem could be avoided, however, by resort to the
existing practice of allowing a secured party to release his interest in a vehicle.
In the case of fleet certificates, the debtor might be required to obtain specific
releases for each vehicle sold; alternatively, a security agreement noted on the
fleet certificate might provide for an automatic release whenever a replace-
ment of vehicles is effected.
Both the fleet certificate and the Code's single financing statement are sub-
ject to a possible weakness in bankruptcy. If on the date of the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy one of the vehicles covered by such a document is with-
in a jurisdiction where that foreign-noted interest is not valid against local
lienors,91 the trustee in bankruptcy may be able to invoke section 70(c) to
avoid the interest in that vehicle. 92 Arguably, if one creditor does in fact exist
in the foreign jurisdiction, the interest might be voided as to all other vehicles
covered by the document, under section 70(e) as interpreted by Moore vz.
Bay.93 In that case, a mortgage was invalidated as to all creditors even though
the creditors who were actually superior to the mortgage could not claim the
entire amount. The hypothetical presented here appears distinguishable, how-
ever, since here the actual superior creditors could in no circumstances claim
prior rights over vehicles outside the foreign state .4 If this distinction is
material, the secured party would lose only his interest in vehicles located in
states not recognizing the foreign security interest.
Purchase Money Interests
Parties who lend on the security of after-acquired vehicles are subordinated
by the Code to holders of purchase money security interests.95 A purchase
money loan is defined as one given by a seller to secure all or part of the
purchase price or "by a person who by making advances or incurring an
91. "Most courts refuse to uphold security interests perfected only in other states
unless the lienor has not consented to the removal." Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 1024, 1046-49
& n.129 (1958) (collecting cases).
92. E.g., Chapman v. England, 231 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1956).
93. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
94. See Wolf v. Aero Factors Corp., 126 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 221
F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1955) (mortgage of chattels in two counties upheld as to chattels located
in county where mortgage was properly filed), cited in 4 COLLMR ff 70.95 n.53c. But see
Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 1024, 1056 (1958).
95. UCC § 9-312(4).
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obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire right in or the use of
collateral if such value is in fact so used." 96 The critical section is 9-312(4).
under which a purchase money interest in collateral other than inventory "has
priority over a conflicting security interest," so long as the purchase money
interest is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the collateral, or
within ten days thereafter.97 In nontitle act states the only complication relat-
ing to purchase money loans relates to section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.98
Section 9-301 provides that the purchase money interest will relate back to
the time the interest was created if it is filed within ten days, thereby taking
precedence over intervening lien creditors. Under section 60(a) (7) of the
Bankruptcy Act, if the lender does not perfect until the eleventh day after the
debtor has received possession of the vehicle, the lender's interest will be a
voidable preference, assuming that all of the other elements of a voidable pref-
erence are present. 9 Moreover, if perfection of the purchase money interest
is delayed beyond ten days, and the debtor's bankruptcy precedes that per-
fection, the trustee will be able to invoke section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act
to set aside the purchase money interest.100 These threats aside, in nontitle
act states a lender's purchase money interest, timely filed, will take priority
over after-acquired property interests in the same vehicles.
No state title acts have been found which grant priority to purchase money
interests over after-acquired property interests. Title act provisions stating
that priority is determined by the order of notation or by the order of filing
an application for notation 101 seem to conflict with the Code rule. In actual
practice, however, the title act priority rules would usually give priority to
the purchase money lender. Since the purchase money lender will normally
lend near the time of actual purchase, he can usually provide for immediate
possession of the certificate covering the acquired vehicle, before any other
secured party can obtain it. Notation of his interest on the certificate would
thus occur prior to any other notation. The purchase money lender's position
would be jeopardized in only a few situations. If another secured party obtains
the certificate first, that party may prevail over the purchase money lender.
Even this possibility may be avoided, however, if the title act provides a rela-
96. UCC § 9-107.
97. If the collateral is inventory vehicles, the purchase money interest will take priority
over conflicting security interests only if it is perfected at the time the debtor receives the
vehicles. The purchase money lender must also notify the holder of a conflicting interest
before the debtor has received the collateral that the lender intends to acquire a purchase
money interest in described inventory. UCC §§ 9-312(3) (a), -(b), -(c).
98. 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a), -(b) (1958).
99. See 3 COLLIER § 60.39, at p. 919; Kennedy, supra note 75, at 527-29.
100. 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1958). The most recent case interpret-
ing § 70(c), Lewis v. Manufacturers' Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961), narrowed the
trustee's power under this section by reversing the broad hypothetical lien creditor test
articulated in Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954).
101. See notes 66, 67 mupra,
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tion-back period 102 and the purchase money lender applies for notation with-
in that period, thus dating his security interest for purposes of priority from
the time the purchase money agreement was created. 0 3 Another possible way
of subordinating the purchase money lender might arise if states adopted the
fleet certificate proposal suggested above. Under that proposal, placing a de-
scription of the acquired vehicle on an existing fleet certificate already subject
to an after-acquired property agreement has the effect of subordinating any
purchase money interests which accompany the application for certification.
That proposal should not be adopted, therefore, unless an explicit provision
is included requiring a description on the certificate of the kind of interest
noted and declaring that purchase money interests take priority.
It is desirable that purchase money security interests take priority over
other types of security interests. The purchase money lender may be reluctant
to advance funds if he must run the risk of being subordinated. Without such
funds, there would often be no property to which the after-acquired property
interest could attach. 0 4 Purchase money interests perfected by notation might
be accorded priority in several ways. One theory might engraft section 9-312
(4) on to the title act priority scale. Thus a title act clause which specifies
that priority between security interests in a vehicle is strictly a function of the
order of notation might be judicially read to include the section 9-312(4)
treatment for purchase money interest. Such an analysis might be based on
the axiom that a special act's silence on a particular issue should be supple-
mented by a later general act's solution to the problem.'0 5 Of course, prob-
lems of judicial interpretation can be avoided by an amendment to Code state
title acts, specifying that the section 9-312(4) rule of priority applies to noted
interests. Recent proposed amendments to the Connecticut title act take this
approach.10 6 By whatever route this result is reached, it will necessitate a
modification of any title act clause providing that the certificate should be
delivered to the interest first noted on the certificate.10 7 Such clauses seem
to be founded on the assumption that the interest first noted will actually have
priority, an incorrect assumption in the case of purchase money interests.
102. A relation-back provision usually provides that if a security interest is perfected
within a set period after its creation, it is treated as if perfected simultaneously with its
creation. A~iz. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 28-325(e) (1956) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-72 (1950)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-86 (1953).
103. Ibid.
The Code provides that priority between conflicting security interests in the same col-
lateral shall be determined by the order of perfection regardless of which security interest
attaches first, "unless both are perfected by filing." UCC § 9-312(5) (b). In title act states
adopting the code, those security interests perfected by notation on the certificate would
not be interests "perfected by filing." See UCC § 9-302(3) (b).
104. Cf. UCC § 9-312 comment 3.
105. 1 SUTHERLAND § 2021 n.3 (citing cases).
106. Copy of proposed amendments on file in Yale Law Library.
107. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.24(3) (1958) ; OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4505.08
(Page, Supp. 1959).
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Accordingly, such title acts should be amended to provide for delivery of the
certificate to the holder of the interest which is prior in right-an interest
which may not necessarily be prior in time of notation.
Mechanic's Liens
Section 9-310 of the Code reserves a high priority lien to a mechanic for
the value of services performed in repairing a motor vehicle. A lien for ser-
vices or materials furnished in the ordinary course of business and "given by
statute or rule of law" takes priority over perfected security interests-except
where the statute creating the lien expressly provides otherwise-if the goods
are in the possession of the person in whose favor such a lien arises. 08 Some
title acts explicitly agree with the Code's general policy of priority for mechanic's
lienholders, 0 9 although some limit the priority to a stated amount.110 Some
title acts are ambiguous. They simply state that the notation of a security in-
terest will "constitute constructive notice ... to ... encumbrancers except such
liens as may be authorized by a law dependent upon possession." '' The nega-
tive pregnant of this provision is that actual notice of a perfected security in-
terest defeats a mechanic's lien; so construed, these acts would not extend to
a repairman the same protection that is afforded him under the Code. This
reading, however, seems to stem from ambiguous drafting of a provision pri-
marily designed to give mechanic's lien priority over the security interest noted
on the title. Properly construed, it would conform generally to the result obtain-
ing under the Code.
One of these ambiguous statutes, however, has been construed, by a dif-
ferent rationale, to subordinate mechanic's liens altogether.1 2 This statute is
thus in direct conflict with section 9-310 of the Code which permits the sub-
ordination of a mechanic's lien only when the "statute creating such a lien"
provides that it shall be subordinated." 3 This statement of the Code rule
appears to mean that if the statute which created the lien did not subordinate
it, the title act cannot make it inferior to other interests." 4 It can be argued
that a title act's subordination clause pertaining specifically to motor vehicle
mechanic's liens prevails over the more general mechanic's lien section of the
Code." 8r On the other hand, the comment to section 9-310 asserts that "if the
108. UCC § 9-301.
109. A number of title acts expressly give the repairman priority over noted security
interests. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 38-205 (Supp. 1960) ; CAL. VEH. CODE § 6301 (1960);
CAL. CML CODE § 3068 (Supp. 1960).
110. See, e.g., Nzv. REv. STAT. §§ 482.440, 108.290 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-73
(1950) (priority to the extent of $50).
111. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-5-2(a) (1953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-327 (1955).
112. City Fin. Co. v. Perry, 195 Tenn. 81, 257 S.W.2d 1 (1953).
113. Emphasis added.
114. Where the subordination of the mechanic's lien is effected by the mechanic's lien
statute itself, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 289.41(1) (1958) (subordinating amounts over a
fixed sum), the Code will have no effect. See also NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-201, -203.
115. See 1 SUTHEMAND § 2021.
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statute creating the lien is silent, even though it has been construed by decision
to make the lien subordinate to the security interest, this section [9-310] pro-
vides a rule of interpretation that the lien should take priority over the secu-
rity interest."' 1 6
Analysis of the commercial significance of mechanic's liens seems to dictate
that section 9-310 be construed as repealing the provisions of any title act
subordinating mechanic's liens. Those title act provisions seem to assume that
the mechanic can easily determine whether a vehicle is subject to a security
interest by inspecting the certificate of title, and can protect himself from be-
coming a junior lienholder. Even in a state in which the certificate is delivered
to the holder of the senior security interest, a mechanic would be put on notice
that the vehicle might be subject to a security interest by the debtor's inability
to produce the certificate.117 This reasoning implies that a mechanic, knowing
the vehicle to be subject to a security interest, can assure payment of his
claim either by refusing to work on the vehicle without payment in advance,
or by seeking a subordination agreement from the prior secured party. This
inconvenient procedure seems undesirable; to the extent that repair is actually
discouraged by this procedure, the priority system seems particularly onerous
in the motor vehicle repair field, since the vehicles are so frequently needed
for daily use.118 A better approach would be to assume that the secured party
has impliedly consented to all reasonable repairs. 1 9 The mechanic has pre-
sumably increased the value of the vehicle by an amount at least roughly
correspondent to the reasonable cost of his repairs. The mechanic should,
therefore, take priority to the extent of his contribution to the enhanced value
of the vehicle, as measured by his lien.
INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE SECURITY INTERESTS
The effect in a Code state of security interests created elsewhere varies
according to three factors: First, whether or not a title act is in operation in
the Code state; second, whether or not the security interest was created and
perfected in a title act state; and, third, the nature of the motor vehicle secur-
ing the transaction. Section 9-103 of the Code divides vehicles into two cate-
gories: "equipment or inventory"'120 are those "used or bought for use pri-
116. UCC § 9-310 comment 2.
117. Note, 33 CONN. B.J. 474, 478-79 (1959). But see cases subordinating mechanic
to interests perfected in a foreign nontitle act state. Nelson-Collins-Nash, Inc. v. Associates
Discount Corp., 193 Tenn. 696, 249 S.W.2d 902 (1952); American Loan Co. v. See, 298
Ky. 180, 182 S.W.2d 644 (1944). Consider the problem in the context of 72 Stat. 812
(1958), 49 U.S.C. § 313 (1958). See text at notes 141-56 in!ra.
118. Bitt see Ehrlich v. Chapple, 311 Ill. 467, 143 N.E. 61 (1924). See also 7A BLASH-
FIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOmoBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5162 (perm. ed. 1950).
119. A number of cases have found consent implied on various theories, e.g., possession
by the debtor. See, e.g., Etchen v. Dennis & Son Garage, 104 Kan. 241, 178 Pac. 408 (1919).
Guaranty Sec. Corp. v. Brophy, 243 Mass.,597, 137 N.E. 751 (1923).
120. UCC § 9-103(2).
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marily in business" (equipment) ,121 or held for lease by the debtor to others
(inventory) ;122 the second category encompasses all other vehicles. 23 The
first category will be referred to herein as "equipment."
Equipment Vehicles
Section 9-103(4) of the Code provides that where any vehicle is covered by
a certificate issued in a mandatory-notation title act state, perfection of secu-
rity interests in that vehicle is "governed by the law of the jurisdiction which
issued the certificate." If the Code state has a title act of its own, incorporated
into the Code, this provision must be interpreted in light of that title act.
Some state title acts forbid the sale or encumbrance of any vehicle not covered
by a certificate of title issued locally, 24 and others require that a local certifi-
cate be obtained after arrival.'2 5 These provisions would seem to continue in
force when the Code is adopted. When a new certificate is issued pursuant to
local law, the law governing the security interest would then seem to be local
law. Implicit in subsection 4, therefore, must be the notion that perfection is
governed by the law of the state which issued the first certificate, until such
time as the local title act requires the issuance of a new certificate.
When an "equipment" vehicle is not covered by a certificate of title under
a law which requires notation of security interests on the certificate, section
9-103(2) provides that a party wishing to perfect a security interest in such
a vehicle must do so under the law of the "chief place of business" of the
debtor. "Chief place of business" is not defined in the text of the Code. In a
comment to section 9-103, however, the drafters note that the phrase means
"the place from which in fact the debtor manages the main part of his business
operation," rather than the place of incorporation; it is the "place where per-
sons dealing with the debtor would normally look for credit information.' 26
121. UCC § 9-109(2).
122. UCC § 9-109(4).
123. UCC § 9-103(3).
124. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 319.21, -.22 (1958); see also CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14-169, -16 (1960) (pertaining to sale).
125. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 201 (1960).
126. UCC § 9-103 comment 3.
A similar policy function appears to underlie the notion of a "principal place of busi-
ness" in two federal statutes which have been the subject of judicial interpretation-§ 2(1)
of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 66 Stat. 420 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1958), and § 1332
(c) of the Judiciary Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958). Congress has directed that § 2(1)
of the Bankruptcy Act furnish the criteria for determining "principal place of business"
under § 1332(c) of the Judiciary Act. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1958) in
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3099, 3100 (1958). Under § 1332(c) of the Judiciary Act
"principal place of business" has been defined as "the nerve center from which (the cor-
poration) radiates out to its constituent parts and from which its officers direct, control,
and coordinate all activities, without regard to locale, in the furtherance of the corporate
objective." Scott Typewriter Corp., Inc. v. Underwood Typewriter Corp., 170 F. Supp.
862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). One bankruptcy court has suggested a possibly contrary View. See
In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., 59 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1932) (dictum suggesting that prin-
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Pending judicial approval of these definitions, however, the drafters advise
prospective secured parties to file in several places.'
27
Once a prospective secured party has determined that an equipment vehicle
is not covered by a mandatory notation certificate of title, and has located the
debtor-owner's chief place of business, section 9-103(2) directs the secured
party to perfect his interest in that jurisdiction. If the debtor's chief place of
business is in a non-Code state, the secured party may encounter a rule in that
state preventing the valid perfection of security interests in chattels not situ-
ated within that state.128 In such cases the secured party must file wherever
the conflict of laws rules of the chief-place-of-business state provide that the
interest should be perfected.129 Under accepted conflicts rules, the state of the
chief place of business will recognize a perfection made at the situs of the
chattel.'30 Since the Code applies only when the chattel is situated within the
Code jurisdiction, 31 this rule would mean in practice that the secured party
must file in the Code state if the chief-place-of-business state refuses recorda-
tion-as the Code itself provides.
32
There is, however, a substantial exception to the rule granting recognition
to situs filing: if the secured party has consented to the removal of the vehicle
from its situs at the time of perfection, there are a number of states which
will not recognize an interest perfected at that situs. 34 If the lender knew
that the vehicles were to be used in more than one jurisdiction, consent will
be presumed. 3 5 Since section 9-103(2) applies to vehicles "of a type which
are normally used in more than one jurisdiction," that rule would probably
apply to many security interests covered by this section. Not all interests will
be subject to the consent rule, however, since a vehicle of the "type" described
in section 9-103(2) may not, in fact, be one which the parties contemplate
using in another state. Under the "consent" rule, a security interest attaching
to the vehicle in a non-Code jurisdiction would take priority over the interest
perfected at an earlier situs of the vehicle.' 36 More significantly, if the juris-
diction to which the vehicle has been removed allows some general creditors to
obtain a judicial lien on property covered by a belatedly filed mortgage, the
cipal place of business of a transportation corporation is jurisdiction in which its vehicles
travel the most revenue-miles).
127. UCC § 9-103 comment 3.
128. See, e.g., Vevaris v. Egan, 226 Ill. App. 500 (1922) ; Stumberg, Chattel Security
Transactions and the Conflict of Laws, 27 IowA L. REv. 528, 546 (1942).
129. UCC § 9-103(2).
130. See authorities cited note 27 supra.
131. UCC § 9-103 comment 1, referring to UCC § 9-102.
132. UCC § 9-103(2).
133. See authorities cited note 27 supra.
134. See, e.g., Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. West, 260 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App.
1953); Universal Fin. Co. v. Clary, 227 N.C. 247, 41 S.E.2d 760 (1947); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 26-929 (Supp. 1959) ; RE:STATEIENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 265-78 (1934).
135. See Robbins v. Bastian, 138 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1943) ; United Constr. v. Milan,
124 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1942).
136. See cases cited note 134 supra.
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trustee in bankruptcy may be able to avoid the entire security interest in the
vehicle under section 70(e), provided that one such general creditor actually
exists'
37
On the other hand, if the debtor's chief place of business is in a Code state,
the secured party will have no difficulty in filing his interest there.' 38 That
interest may not be recognized, however, in a non-Code state whose conflicts
rules require that an interest in a chattel be perfected at its situs. Here the
general rule upholding security interests perfected at the situs of the chattel
at the time the interest attached works against the secured party, since courts
following the rule would probably not recognize chief-place-of-business filing
in lieu of situs filing. Thus when a chattel mortgage is executed and perfected
in a Code state, on property located in another state, the law of the situs will
normally govern its effectiveness. 130 If the interest is not perfected in the situs
state, lien creditors or a trustee in bankruptcy can prevail over the secured
party.
Application of the "situs jurisdiction" rule in these cases seems particularly
harsh where mobile chattels are involved. It would seem preferable to accept
the Code view that the secured party has acted properly in perfecting his in-




Section 313 of Title 49 of the United States Code makes special provision
for certain vehicles that are within the "equipment or inventory" category of
section 9-103(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code. This federal enactment,
of course, governs in any case of conflict between it and a state statute. The
federal statute is directed towards large motor trucks and buses owned or
leased by interstate carriers certificated by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. 14 1 It is designed to relieve holders of security interests in such vehicles
of the need to perfect their interests in every jurisdiction through which
the vehicles might pass.142 Congress rejected one obvious method for achiev-
ing this end-the establishment of a national filing office, the records of which
137. See text at notes 93-94 supra.
138. Filing is authorized by UCC § 9-103(2).
139. E.g., Steckel v. Swift & Co., 56 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. App. 1933) ; see authorities
cited note 27 supra; see generally Note, 66 YALE L.J. 567 (1957).
140. See UCC § 9-103 comment 3. See also Comment, 9 Am. J. ComP. L. 458 (1960).
141. 72 Stat. 812 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 313(a) (1) (1958). A motor vehicle governed
by the act must be a) a truck having a rated capacity (gross vehicle weight) of ten thou-
sand pounds or more; or b) a highway tractor having a rated capacity (gross combination
weight) of ten thousand pounds or more; or c) a property-carrying trailer or semi-trailer
having one or more load-carrying axles of ten thousand pounds or more; or d) any mot6r
bus having a seating capacity of ten persons or more. 78 Stat. 812 (1958), 49 U.S.C.
§ 313(a) (6) (1958).
142. H.R. REP. No. 2354, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., in 2 U.S. CODE: CONG. & ADm. NEws
3773-74 (1958) ; see Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 1024, 1043-58 (1958).
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would constitute constructive notice of perfected security interests in these
large vehicles.1 43 It provided instead that any security interest in a vehicle
owned or leased by a certificated carrier which secures an underlying obliga-
tion of that carrier may be perfected by notation on any certificate of title
covering the vehicle.'4 4 In addition, if no certificate of title covers the vehicle,
the security interest may be perfected under the recording system of the home
state-defined as equivalent to the Code's "chief place of business" 4U--of the
debtor carrier. 46 Finally, if the vehicle is not covered by a certificate of title,
and recording of the interest in the home state is not possible, the "law" of
the home state is to govern perfection. 14 The act validates a security interest
perfected in accordance with the act "against all general creditors of, and sub-
sequent lien creditors of, and all subsequent purchasers from, the debtor car-
rier."' 48 This statute, therefore, does not constitute the exclusive method of
perfecting a security interest in a vehicle; it merely gives priority over sub-
sequent secured parties to those who comply with its mechanism. Consequent-
ly, a prospective secured party must still carefully check the many perfection
routes by which interests in the vehicle may have been perfected prior to the
perfection of his own interest. A mere check of the records in the home state
of the debtor carrier will not guarantee a secured party that a vehicle is free
of prior security interests perfected in another state.
When a motor vehicle is covered by any certificate of title, the federal
statute grants priority to interests noted on the certificate.14 However, under
the applicable title act one party may be unable to perfect certain types of
security interests by notation. For example, several title acts do not provide
for the notation of leases.1 0 "Leases" are regarded as security interests by
the federal statute, presumably referring to the "security lease" concept of the
Uniform Commercial Code which recognizes that some leases may be little
more than a financing arrangement whereby the secured party holds nominal
title, and the "rent" payments actually constitute payments on the loan.r" If
a lessor is refused the right to note his interest on a certificate of title cover-
ing a leased vehicle, he cannot realize the benefit of the federal statute if he
143. Id. at -3774-75. Security interests in railroad rolling stock are so perfected, 49
U.S.C. § 20c (1958), as are interests in ships, 41 Stat. 1000 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 911-84 (1958), and aircraft, Civil Aeronautics Act, § 503, 52 Stat. 1006 (1938), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 523 (1958).
144. 72 Stat. 812 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 313(b) (1958).
145. H.R. No. 2354, supra note 120, at 3773. -
146. 72 Stat. 812 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 313(c) (1958).
147. 72 Stat. 812 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 313(d) (1958).-
148. 72 Stat. 812 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 313(b), -(c), -(d) (1958).
150. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:710(A) (1950) ; Nav. REv. STAT. § 482.425
(1960). Both refer only to chattel mortgages.
151. See UCC § 1-201(37). The advisors to the draftsmen of the federal statute in-
cluded several of those who participated in preparing the Uniform Commercial Code. See
H.R. REP. No. 2354, supra note 142, at 3775.
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then uses another form of recordation in the carrier's home state. The act
states that only a security interest in a vehicle "for which a certificate of title
has not been issued" can be perfected otherwise than by notation. 152 This read-
ing of the statute might be regarded as the product of a poorly drafted at-
tempt to provide alternative means of filing all interests. On the other hand,
failure to protect leases which cannot be noted might be justified by the view
that, if a vehicle has a certificate, it should not be subject to nationally per-
fected interests which do not appear on the certificate. The effect of this read-
ing is to deprive the secured party of the federal act's guarantee that his in-
terest will be recognized against all subsequent secured parties. In this situa-
tion, the lessee's only recourse is to perfect his interest wherever he can
record-for example, the home state of the debtor carrier, his own residence,
or states in which the vehicle may at some time be located-and to rely upon
the courts of other states to recognize that interest against subsequent inter-
ests conveyed by the lessor and perfected under the federal act.153
The federal statute may prove similarly ineffectual where a motor vehicle
is not covered by a certificate of title, and where the home state of the debtor
carrier insists that security interests in chattels not located within the state
be perfected at their situs. In these cases subsection (d) of the federal act
directs the secured party to the conflict of laws rules of the home state in
order to determine where to perfect his interest. 154 These rules in non-Code
states usually indicate that the situs of the vehicle at the time the interest
attaches is the proper place to record. 55 Perfection there would have nation-
wide effect against subsequent secured parties dealing with the debtor carrier.
Assume, however, that a subsequent secured party attempted to acquire an
interest in a vehicle after it had been moved from the jurisdiction where a
prior interest was perfected. If he looks to the conflicts rules of the home
state at that time, they would direct him to the recording system of the new
situs of the vehicle. These records, of course, would not disclose the security
interest previously perfected at the former situs. The subsequent secured party
would then have to search the recording systems of all the jurisdictions in
which the vehicle might at one time have been located-the same situation
which would have confronted him had there been no federal act. This defect
might be remedied by deleting subsection (d), and by providing that recorda-
tion in the home state would constitute valid perfection under the federal
statute, whatever its status under state law. Such a provision would be un-
workable only in the unlikely evert-that the state agency would refuse to
record. 1 6 Of course, as more states enact the Uniform Commercial Code, this
152. 72 Stat. 812 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 313Zc) (1958).
153. See text at note 148 supra.
154. See 72 Stat. 812 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 313(d) (1958).
155. See text at note 130 supra.
156. Cf. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) (refusal of state to issue certificate
necessary for interstate motor carrier to use state highways was undue restriction forbidden
by the commerce clause).
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problem will be alleviated by section 9-103(2) which expressly permits re-
cordation in the home state of a debtor carrier.
Nonequipment Vehicles
Security interests created in a foreign state in motor vehicles which are not
classed as "equipment" or "inventory" under section 9-103(2) of the Code
are governed by sections 9-103(3) and 9-103(4).' 57 These two sections ad-
dress themselves to three possible situations: 1) If the incoming vehicle is
not covered by a mandatory notation certificate of title, any security interest
perfected in a foreign state continues perfected in the Code state for four
months; if the secured party perfects within the Code state within that four
month period, the interest remains perfected from the date of original per-
fection in the foreign state.158 If the secured party fails to re-perfect his in-
terest within four months, a later re-perfection does not date back to the date
of the original perfection.'3 9 2) If the security interest was not perfected in
the foreign state, it may be perfected in the Code state after the vehicle has
been brought there. This perfection does not relate back to the time when the
interest was created in the foreign state; rather, it dates from the time of per-
fection in the Code state.160 3) If the incoming vehicle is covered by a cer-
tificate of title which requires notation of all security interests, any interest so
noted will be accorded priority over subsequently perfected interests.',' Parties
wishing to perfect interests in vehicles which are covered by out-of-state cer-
tificates of title must exercise the same caution as the holder of a security
interest in an equipment vehicle . 62 First, the secured party must determine
if his interest has been noted on a mandatory-notation certificate of title; if
not, he must re-perfect that interest within four months of the vehicle's entry
into the Code state. Second, interests perfected through mandatory-notation
certificates are governed by the law of the issuing jurisdiction only until such
time as the Code state's title act may require the issuance of a new certificate.
Section 9-103(3) guarantees that security interests perfected in nonman-
datory notation states will remain perfected for four months in a Code state.
During this four month period the holder of such an interest is accorded the
same protection as if he had perfected in the Code state itself.1 3 After four
months have elapsed the interest stands on the same footing in the Code state
as any other unperfected interest.' 0 ' Subsequent secured parties who perfect
157. See UCC §§ 9-109(2), -(4).
158. UCC § 9-103(3). For a similar provision, see Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate
of Title and Anti-Theft Act, 9B UNIFORm LAWs ANN. § 20 (1957).
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
161. UCC § 9-103(4).
162. See text at notes 124-25 supra.
163. UCC § 9-103 comment 7.
164. UCC § 9-103 comment 7. See also UCC § 9-403 comment 3.
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their interests in the Code state will prevail over the secured party who failed
to re-perfect. 1 5 Lien creditors without knowledge of the existence of a prior
interest will also take priority over such an interest if they obtain liens before
it is perfected.' 66 And buyers not in the ordinary course of business who ac-
quire the vehicle without knowledge of a pre-existing interest in it will take
free of that interest to the extent that they give value and take delivery.
167
Of course, even if the out-of-state security interest is never re-perfected in
the Code state, it will prevail over lien creditors and buyers not in the ordi-
nary course of business who have notice of its existence. 68
Article Nine's provision that incoming security interests remain perfected
in the Code state for a four month period may conflict with either of two types
of title acts that may be in force in a jurisdiction enacting the Code. Some
title acts make no mention of foreign security interests.16 9 A court construing
such a statute may determine that the local title act was meant to be pre-
emptive in matters concerning motor vehicle security interests. In such a case
some courts might apply the pre-Code doctrines which had the effect of sub-
ordinating incoming security interests to local purchasers and lien creditors.
170
It seems preferable, however, to construe the Code's positive statement of
policy on this point as superseding the common law drawn from a statute
silent on the subject. 171 Under this interpretation, the incoming security in-
terests would remain perfected for four months without notation on the Code
state's title certificate.
The second type of title act which may conflict with section 9-103(3) is
the title act which purports to deal with foreign security interests. For ex-
ample, section 20 of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-
Theft Act 172 recognizes a security interest noted on any type of title certifi-
cate issued by the jurisdiction where the vehicle was located when the interest
attached; the Code recognizes such an interest only if notation is mandatory
under the foreign law, but recognition of such interests is not affected by
whether the vehicle was located in the jurisdiction issuing the certificate. 173
If the interest is perfected in a nontitle act jurisdiction in which the vehicle
was located at the time the interest was created, the Uniform Act provides
165. UCC § 9-103 comment 7.
166. UCC § 9-301(b).
167. UCC §§ 9-301(b), -(c).
168. See text at note 58 supra.
169. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-1 (Supp. 1950) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 101 (1960);
see Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 754, 758-60 (1959).
170. See text at notes 28-29 supra.
171. Where a special or local statute purports to treat a particular subject matter but
fails to provide for a given circumstance the general law on the subject will be con-
sidered as supplementing the special law by supplying the law to govern that situa-
tion.
1 SUTHERLAND § 2021 n.3 (citing cases).
172. 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. § 20.
173. UCC § 9-103(4).
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that it continues perfected for four months after a certificate of title is issued
in the Uniform Act state;174 under the Code, such interests continue per-
fected for four months after entry into the Code state.1 75 The difference be-
tween the provisions is illustrated by the situation in which the owner is not
required to obtain a new certificate in the second state for, say, one year.
While the Code protects security interests in such vehicles for only four
months after entry, the Uniform Act presumably regards the interest as per-
fected for one year and four months more. The Code-Uniform Act state may,
of course, avoid most of the conflict if its title act provides that a certificate
of title must be issued for the vehicle immediately upon its arrival, or soon
thereafter. But the remaining possibility of conflict between the protection
granted by the Code and by the Uniform Act dictates that Uniform Act states
adopting the Code should repeal any provisions in their title acts dealing with
foreign-created security interests, providing instead that section 9-103 (3) and
(4) will govern foreign-perfected interests. A similar amendment has been
proposed in Connecticut. 176 This amendment might well be adopted in all title
act states which enact the Code. Courts dealing with title acts which are silent
on the matter of foreign security interests will be relieved of the temptation
to bypass the Code and apply the older "common law."
174. 9B UNIFORI LAWS ANN. § 20.
175. UCC § 9-103(3).
176. Copy of proposed amendments on file in Yale Law Library. The proposal also
provides for the inclusion of subsection (2)'s priority rules, relating to equipment vehicles.
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